Analysts and observers have variously applauded or denounced Cisco for its network-Cisco ONE programmability pronouncements last week. Some pilloried the company for being tentative in its approach to SDN, contrasting the industry giant’s perceived reticence with its aggressive pursuit of previous emerging technology markets such as IP PBX, videoconferencing, and converged infrastructure (servers).
Conversely, others have lauded Cisco’s approach to SDN as far more aggressive than its lackluster reply to challenges in market segments such as application-delivery controllers (ADCs) and WAN optimization, where F5 and Riverbed, respectively, demonstrated how a tightly focused strategy and expertise above the network layer could pay off against Cisco.
Different This TIme
But I think they’ve missed a very important point about Cisco’s relationship to the emerging SDN market. Analogies and comparisons should be handled with care. Close inspection reveals that SDN and the applications it enables represent a completely different proposition from the markets mentioned above.
Let’s break this down by examining Cisco’s aggressive pursuit of IP-based voice and video. It’s not a mystery as to why Cisco chose to charge headlong into those markets. They were opportunities for Cisco to pursue its classic market adjacencies in application-related extensions to its hegemony in routing and switching. Cisco also saw video as synergistic with its core network-infrastructure business because it generated bandwidth-intensive traffic that filled up existing pipes and required new, bigger ones.
Meanwhile, Cisco’s move into UCS servers was driven by strategic considerations. Cisco wanted the extra revenue servers provided, but it also wanted to preemptively seize the advantage over its former server partners (HP, Dell, IBM) before they decided to take the fight to Cisco. What’s more, all the aforementioned vendors confronted the challenge of continuing to grow their businesses and public-market stock prices in markets that were maturing and slowing.
Cisco’s reticence to charge into WAN optimization and ADCs also is explicable. Strategically, at the highest echelons within Cisco, the company viewed these markets as attractive, but not as essential extensions to its core business. The difficulty was not only that Cisco didn’t possess the DNA or the acumen to play in higher-layer network services — though that was definitely a problem — but also that Cisco did not perceive those markets as conferring sufficiently compelling rewards or strategic advantages to warrant the focus and resources necessary for market domination. Hence, we have F5 Networks and its ADC market leadership, though certainly F5’s razor-sharp focus and sustained execution factored heavily into the result.
To Be Continued
Now, let’s look at SDN. For Cisco, what sort of market does it represent? Is it an opportunity to extend its IP-based hegemony, like voice, video, and servers? No, not at all. Is it an adjunct market, such as ADCs and WAN optimization, that would be nice to own but isn’t seen as strategically critical or sufficiently large to move the networking giant’s stock-price needle? No, that’s not it, either.
So, what is SDN’s market relationship to Cisco?
Simply put, it is a potential existential threat, which makes it unlike IP PBXes, videoconferencing, compute hardware, ADCs, and WAN optimization. SDN is a different sort of beast, for reasons that have been covered here and elsewhere many times. Therefore, it necessitates a different sort of response — carefully calculated, precisely measured, and thoroughly plotted. For Cisco, the ONF-sanctioned approach to SDN is not an opportunity that the networking giant can seize, but an incipient threat to the lifeblood of its business that it must blunt and contain — and, whatever else, keep out of its enterprise redoubt.
Did Cisco achieve its objective? That’s for a subsequent post.
I completely agree, SDN threatens to move the intelligence and the highest value add of networking from the current devices to something new – a network controller. The switches themselves become commodities under SDN. Of course Cisco views this as a threat.
Cisco’s announcement was intended to:
1. Slow does the movement to SDN
2. Suggest an alternative approach based on an all-Cisco network.
Ciscos’s approach won’t allow for non-Cisco devices – because they are adding network control APIs to their switches and routers. I haven’t seen any sign that they will open up those APIs. This is the Apple approach to engaging an threatening eco-system. It worked for Apple . . . .
Its a game from Cisco of stalling the market and raising the hype that the Cisco solution will be the end all be all, then deliver a disjointed Cisco only solution. In the end it is not is Cisco’s best interest, as the incumbent vendor, to disrupt the market remember its a business and Cisco is making decisions that are right for its business not the customer…
BTW – I do not see SDN commoditizing the market but that is another topic….