Today I want to expand on ideas I have presented previously. I think these concepts, relating to China’s industrial strategy for its technology sector, are important for readers to understand and internalize. Eventually, they will affect most o us, one way or another.
I’ve written often about how the Western companies seeking to sell their products in China confront a genuine dilemma. They really must choose between two outcomes that are likely to be undesirable: They can enter the Chinese market at the risk of losing intellectual property and long-term competitive advantage, or they can refrain from playing in China, perhaps retaining their IP and competitive advantage in other markets but surrendering short-term gains in China to others.
In the end, no matter what path they take, they still might find themselves threatened on the global stage by vendors from China.
Most public companies, with institutional investors breathing down their necks, will plunge headlong into China for the near-term pop. Most of these companies, facing quarterly pressures to deliver results, will not consider, or will choose to studiously ignore, the long-term implications of their decision to play in China by China’s rules. In their minds, they have no choice but to play the game. They don’t want to explain to shareholders why they aren’t chasing what is ostensibly the biggest technology growth market in the world.
Other companies, admittedly in the minority, will choose not to play in China or will limit their exposure there. In limiting their exposure, they’ll also limit their near-term gains, but they’ll also keep most of their core IP and have a better chance of holding off Chinese technology competitors when those players seek hegemony beyond their home base.
And make no mistake: China is pursuing nationalist mercantilism as industrial strategy for its technology sector. China aspirations for the technology sector aren’t limited to its current stereotype as the world’s low-cost manufacturer of consumer electronics, computers, and networking gear. For China, development of its technology sector — encompassing cleantech as well as strategic aspects of information technology and communications — is integral to its long-term economic, industrial, political, and social stability.
China goal isn’t to let Google, Cisco, HP, Applied Materials, Microsoft, Apple, and Nokia boost their stock prices on Chinese’s sales. Instead, China wishes to create its own Google, Ciscos, Applied Materials. And China has created an industrial policy, within the framework of a concept called “indigenous innovation,” to achieve that goal.
Toward that end, China not only promotes companies, such as Huawei, that it wants to grow into world leaders, but it also develops a regulatory structure that inhibits and restricts that gains that foreign companies can make on its soil. In this respect, the aim is to ensure that Chinese companies dominate China’s markets, as Baidu did against Google, and as Huawei is doing against HP and Cisco.
With is “China Out” strategy, 3Com’s H3C master plan was not dissimilar from the national technology blueprint of China itself. There are differences, of course. 3Com is but one company, and it’s less Chinese now, after being bought by HP, than it was before, as an entity that grew from 3Com’s joint venture with Huawei. What’s more, 3Com has less power and fewer resources at its disposal. It essentially wanted to win early customers with low-cost, good-quality products in China, then use economies of scale and aggressive pricing to capture market share elsewhere.
China wants to do essentially the same thing for its technology companies, but it has tremendous power, influence, and resources at its disposal. It can use regulations, policies, and prohibitions to condition the result it desires. It can make life easier for indigenous companies while making life much harder for Western firms operating on Chinese soil. It can devise and enforce rules that require Western companies to disclose intellectual property or other trade secrets as conditions of selling products or winning accounts in the country. It can, and does, establish intellectual-property laws that favor the home side.
I think it’s critical for denizens of the technology industry to fully appreciate what China is trying to achieve. This is not business as usual.